DISCREPANCIES IN THE ENVIRONMENTALLY CONSTROVERSIAL BUJAGALI DAM PROJECT: LOCAL VERSUS NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERCEPTIONS

 

 

By

F.C. OWEYEGHA- AFUNADUULA

Website: http://www.afuna.org or http://www.afuna.o-f.com

Email:afunaduula2000@yahoo.co.uk or afunaduula@afuna.org

Tel: +256 78 555 222 or +256 71 845461

 

10^th April 2001

 INTRODUCTION

 There are many controversial "development" projects in Africa today. However, none have attracted so much controversy as the proposed Bujagali Dam Project.  

The President of Uganda, Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, decreed the Bujagali Dam Project. The President used the full force of the almost personalized Presidency

(i)         To shield the project from competitive bidding;

(ii)         Secure a secret Power Purchase Agreement (PPA);

(iii)        To guarantee the huge US $ 500 million loan from the international money market;

(iv)        To ensure that the legislative process generated a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) that favoured the preferred energy developer; and

(v)         To secure parliamentary approval of the project in the midst of much controversy.

 As if all this was not enough to put the project on course, the President did not hide his personal commitment to the project when, according to local and international press reports, he revealed that he was in a way, a public relations officer of AES.  He further influenced the legislative product regarding the Bujagali project, when he told members of Parliament that if they withheld approval of the project, US-Uganda relations would be harmed.

This background to the Bujagali Dam controversy is necessary if one is to understand the current differences in perception of the Project between the local people at the dam site; the local non-governmental organisations (NGOs); and  the international NGOs and other institutions that influence international environment and development dynamics.

This article aims to:

i)   Appraise the discrepancies that have bogged the environmentally (and culturally) controversial Bujagali dam project; and

ii)  Examine the reasons for the differences in perception of the project at the local, national and international levels with a view to explaining "why".  

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES  

According to a paper by Deepak in a prestigious business magazine, Institutional Investor, the Bujagali Dam Project has its origins in a Museveni-Bakke meeting in U.S.A in the mid 1990s. AES says it has been in Uganda since then and that it can only go away if the people of Uganda say that it should.

Given the level of political development in Uganda, which is so low, and the choice of individual merit approach to political development espoused by President Museveni, AES statement may be construed to mean the latter.

It is President Museveni who wanted the project and it is only he who can say not to it. The recent judicial, executive and legislative history regarding the Bujagali dam process indicates that what the executive has desired has stood the test of time.  

It is not surprising, therefore, that citations of corruption of the process locally and internationally continued to be ignored towards the end of the 21^st century, by both the political and financial powers that be in Kampala and Washington. The project process was left to flow on into the new millennium. The original World Bank Project Information Document sounded extremely defensive and supportive of the project. Money and power were united in implementing their joint perception of the dam project as the pathway to eradication of poverty in Uganda.  

Nevertheless, it is significant to note that the World Bank and IFC have put in place what are called ""Safeguard Policies (Table 1). History shows that many of these have been flouted by the two institutions in projects they have supported in many parts of the World. 

TABLE 1: World Bank Group and IFC Safeguard Policies

Safeguard Policy	What Does it Say?
OP 4.10 Indigenous People (IF)	This IFC operational Policy Instrument is forthcoming. But in the interim, projects are required to comply with the World Bank's OD 4.20  "Indigenous Peoples".  The policy aims to ensure that indigenous people benefit from development projects and are unaffected by potentially adverse effects.
OD 4.20 Indigenous Peoples (WB)	This policy does not say that if a project affects indigenous peoples, that project does not proceed.  All it demands is that a project sponsor develops an indigenous peoples development Plan.
Safeguard Policy	What does it Say?
OP 4.11 Cultural Property (IFC)	This policy is forthcoming. It demands that, in the meantime, projects comply with the World Bank's OBN 11.03 "Cultural Property". It does not prevent a project that is potentially dangerous. It only demands that a project assists in the preservation, protection and enticement of cultural properties and avoids their total elimination.
OPN 11.03 Cultural Property	This is quiet about rejection of a project on the basis of potential damage to cultural property. All it says is that, if there is any question on cultural property in an area, a brief reconnaissance should be undertaken. The definition of cultural property includes unique natural environmental features (canyons, water falls) with cultural values.
OP 4.12 Involuntary Resettlement (IFC)	This policy, which is forthcoming, does not reject a potentially dangerous project. All it demands is that, in the interim, projects comply with the World Bank' Group's OD 4.30 "'Involuntary Resettlement''. The aim of the policy is just to minimize the effects involuntary resettlement of the people affected by the projects.
OD 4.30 Involuntary Resettlement (World Bank)	This policy is not against dangerous projects, and does not stop them. Therefore, there is nothing for those who would not like culture to be extinct to jubilate about. All that the policy does is to: i)                   Set out procedures for baseline studies, impact analyses and mitigation plans for affected people ii)                Demand a Resettlement Action Plan (RAP); and iii)              Demand that RAP addresses both physical resettlement and economic effects.

In reality the so-called safeguard policies have been unhelpful tot he helpless, hapless local and indigenous people. This is because they simply provide "relief" to them, probably before and after the project is in place. Rejection of a project that is likely to wipe out whole cultures is not built in these policies.

Therefore, the World Bank and IFC have been committed and seem, via those policies, to be ready to be committed to hearing, and not listening, to the real concerns of the local people and others who are defending the cultures threatened by mega-projects.  

THE  DESCREPANCIES  

A lot has been written about the Bujagali Dam Project, perhaps reflecting both the international status of the Bujagali Falls and, hence, the controversial nature of the project globally. Many discrepancies are detectable:

a)     Presidentially -driven project;

b)     Corporate freedom to tell lies about NGO involvement in the Project;

c)     Promises by AES or free electricity, social services like schools, hospitals, employment opportunities and new infrastructures long-before any agreement was formally reached between Government and the company;

d)     Shielding of the Dam project from international competitive bidding;    

e)     Bribery of Ministers responsible for Energy Development  (Press Reports) and peasants (e.g., during the Public debate on the AES EIA in Jinja, 6 August, 1999);

f)      Intimidation of Dam opponents (local and foreign);

g)     Falsification of the position of the spirit medium, Nabamba Budhagali, on AES' claim that the shrines can be transferred elsewhere;

h)     Manipulate load shedding of electricity to convince unsuspecting consumers that there was an energy crisis;

i)       Secret PPA;

j)      Presidential controls on legislative process on Bujagali Project;

k)     Blackmail of legislators by President and US Ambassador that U.S-Uganda relations would suffer of the AES Project was not approved;

l)       Total extension of alternatives in the energy studies preceding AES Deal;

m)   Exclusion of poor man's energy source fuel wood from Uganda's energy plan;

n)     Undervaluing of assets and needs of future generations of local people in deciding compensation;

o)     Postponement of compensation of the affected peasants severely;

p)     Total exclusion of the clans of Basoga whose culture and spirituality will be extinguished by Bujagali dam, from the decision-making process;

q)     The use of the Kyabazinga of Busoga, local council chairmen and carefully drilled individuals to say yes to the dubious project;

r)      The decision of the World Bank and IFC to keep the Bujagali Dam process on course despite these discrepancies;

s)      World Bank Bujagali Dam Project Information Document (2000) embracing the project despite the numerous discrepancies subjection of the Bujagali Dam Project to World Bank/IFC safeguard policies, which ignore the concerns about the project but simply decree welfare measures once damage has been done;  

DIFFERENCES IN PERCEPTIONS  

Bujagali dam process, with all its diverse discrepancies, has generated differences in perception at the local, national and international levels.  Indeed, some of the perceptions may be due to the discrepancies. Others have been shaped by the role of the press -local and international - in the process, either advocating for or against the project or informing local, national and international community about the pros and cons of the project.

It might be very useful to analyse the information published in private, state and other media on the proposed project. Such analysis should be able to reveal those against or for the project among ecologists, biologists, researchers, environmentalists in Universities and working for NGOs; Local farmers living in the project area, local government officials, legislators, international organisations working in Uganda and representatives of foreign countries in Kampala.  

If we are to go by the reports in the local press, all the local inhabitants, the majority of the local councilors, the Uganda cabinet, the parliamentary legislators, and the environmental lead agency -the National Environment Management Agency (NEMA)- and of course President Museveni, supported the project.  The press does not reveal that those who supported the project were fully informed about the short- and long-term repercussions at Bujagali or on the real losers - the clans or Busoga. All that seems to be emphasized in the local press, as a benefit is that there will be abundant electricity to all.  

No body among those who are reported to be supporting the project would hate to hear that it is absolutely impossible:  

i)      To supply electricity fully from a central national grid;

ii)      To break the barriers of income poverty and supply hydropower to the peasants;

iii)      To ensure low-cost electricity in Uganda due to the tendency to overprice it and the technical inefficiencies; and

iv)      To revamp the industrial capacity of Jinja - the once main industrial town of Uganda -on the basis of hydropower alone.

Apparently, Jinja now has only 2 "industries" out of 38 in the early 80s, that are still functioning, but are functioning at a capacity of less than 20%: Nile Breweries and Nytil (Picfare). This is despite the fact that it is near the source of the Nile; close to Owen Falls Dam and the Owen Falls Extension Dam.

Why then is Jinja not responding to the electricity boom?  What, in fact, is responsible for the positive  perception of the project by the local leaders, the Kyabazinga and the local people?   Surely, it cannot be electricity is already plentifully available at Jinja.    And, therefore, it cannot be that industries will proliferate in Jinja. The commissioning of Owen Falls Dam Extension dam has not been followed by construction of new factories in the town.  

To get the answer to the questions above, one may have to seek it in the behaviour of AES and the excesses of Government.  Power,  money and lies could explain the myopic perception by those AES says have embraced the project. The same could also explain why local opinions from scientists and environmentalists tended to support the proposed project.

In his comments on the "Bujagali Project Transmission System EIA, December 2000", Lubega (2001) has dismissed AES'  thesis that "there is some significant opposition to the Bujagali Project as a whole, especially amongst international NGOs"' when he writes:

"This is false.  There was opposition to the project from many individuals, NGOs and government agencies, based in Uganda, but these were silenced by the government with threats of dismissal for individuals, and de-registration of NGOs and Agencies, or withdrawal of work permits for foreign workers (especially from UK and USA).  AESNP silenced the indigenous NGOs and some individuals, by paying them bribes, especially the cultural leaders, whose culture and beliefs had direct connection to Bujagali Falls. The only adamant NGOs that refused to be compromised by AESNP and came and openly to oppose the project were National Association of Professional Environmentalists (NAPE) Save Bujagali Crusade (SBC) and Uganda Wildlife Society (UWS)".

It is quite possible that AESNP took it for granted that since the NGOs that resisted being compromised had no financial muscle and access to potential financiers, their principled stand would have no significance or was irrelevant to the project's progress, and so could be ignored (Lubega, 2001).

This arrogant perception by AESNP of local opposition is of course buttressed by government intransigence and high handedness in the energy sector that have favoured the company.

It is easy to see why international NGOs have opposed the Dam project.  First, many of them have financial power and cannot be manipulated by AES.  Second, they have a strong information base and cannot be easily deceived. Third, most of them are well-informed about the corporate crime record of AES in the energy sector globally. Fourth, some have sent delegations to the ground and have first hand information about what has been going on-more so than most local NGOs that have embraced the project. Therefore, the attempt by AES to use the so-called support from local people, NGOs political leaders, etc. to distance the international NGOs from the Bujagali Project is a distortion of the truth.

MYOPIC PERCEPTION AND DEVELOPMENT  

As NAPE and SBC has stated in the past, the use of the ignorance of a  people to sell the acceptability of a project is criminal. If accepted by "development"' institutions, it can institutionalize the use of myopic perceptions and lies as tools in development projects. NAPE and SBC have stated  before that sustainable development should not be a deceptive undertaking, but should be guided by a commitment to truth-telling in all development efforts.  Otherwise, de-development, not development, will be the rule rather than the exception.  

CONCLUSIONS

The Bujagali Dam process has been overridden by numerous discrepancies.  As a result, the project remains one of the most controversial among dam project proposals targeted by World Bank/IFC finance.  Despite this, the project process is on course, at least for now, and the World Bank/IFC are steadily ensuring that, without being encumbered by the constellation of discrepancies AES goes through the remaining stages of the process. One may ask: are the World Bank and IFC truly development institutions? As this scenario manifests itself local and natural perceptions are being projected by AES as solidly pro-Bujagali Project while international perceptions are being dismissed as "unrealistic" though significant. The reason for the dichotomy in perceptions between international NGOs and the local/national NGOs/people is thought to be the triplet of "money power and lies". The triplicate has silenced opposition in Uganda.  On the other hand the predisposition of the international NGOs to be fully knowledgeable about the social irresponsibility and criminal behaviour of AES in and outside Uganda must be part of the explanation. What seems to be unfolding is that sustainable development in Uganda is a new deceptions thanks to Bujagali project.

BIBLIOGRAPHY  

1.     BORMANN, F.H. and S.R. KELLERT (1991).  Ecology, economics, and ethics: the broken circle. Yale University Press, Newhaven and London.  

2.     LUBEGA, D (2001). Comments on the Bujagali Project Transmission System Environmental Impact Statement, December 2001. UWS/NAPE/SBC. Submission to NEMA, Unpublished, 30^th March 2001.  6p.  

3.     ORIEGA-RUBIO, A., D.B. LLUCH-COTA and A. CASTELLANOS (2001). Discrepancies in an environmentally controversial salt production project: Local versus national and international perceptions. Ambio, 30 (1): 64-65.  

4.     SHAFFER, R. (1995). Achieving sustainable economic development in communities. J. Comm. Dev. Cons. Biol. 9: 1584-1558.  

5.     SMITH, G.R. (1998). Are we leaving the community out of rural community sustainability?  An examination of approaches to development and implementation of indicators of rural community sustainability and related public participation.  Int. J. Sust. Dev., World Ecol.  5:82-98. 

6.     VILLER, B. (1994). Sustainable development: a new deception. Cons. Biol. 8:1146-1248.